John J. Mearsheimer, professor at the University of Chicago, is one of the main representatives of the school of realism in international relations. After the end of the Cold War, this author began writing a work that would become a reference in his field, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (W. W. Norton & Company, New York, 2014.). A title far removed from the optimism of the 1990s, when we were assured that the end of History had arrived, with the triumph of a liberal internationalism with an emphasis on the peace and cooperation, arising, above all, from the harmonization of political and economic systems. economic. Liberal democracy and the market economy would go everywhere, hand in hand with globalization, once the page of communist regimes had been turned. However, Mearsheimer undertook the task of writing a book, more about history than foresight, which reminded us that the struggle of the great powers for hegemony was not a theme of past centuries. Moreover, the title underlined the idea of tragedy, which serves as a reminder that politics, both at home and abroad, always resembles a tragedy, understood as the chronicle of a rise and subsequent fall.
In theory, the post-Cold War world was controlled by a single superpower, the USA, but progressively American public opinion, and not so much its politicians, began to realize that the global scenario was not so peaceful. This was demonstrated by Washington's interventions in Iraq (1991), Bosnia (1995), Kosovo (Afghanistan), Iraq (2003), Libya (2011)..., not to mention the war against the Islamic State, which Obama seemed to wage with his peculiar leading the behind. All these conflicts have in common that the US did not fight against a great power. However, the possibility that one day the Americans would find a rival of their stature became a reality with the rise of ChinaThe company is an economic giant rather than a military one, but is gradually gaining a presence on all continents.
In 2001, when the first edition of The Tragedy of Great Power Politics appeared, China's rise was in its infancy and did not merit much space in the book. This has been remedied with an additional chapter, in the 2014 update, in which Mearsheimer tries to answer the question: Will China's rise be peaceful? Our author has been answering the question in the negative for years and defending his thesis against other realists who disagree with him. One of the best known cases was his debate with former Carter National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski in 2005. The latter claimed that the Chinese were only out to make money, not war. In other words, China's rise would be similar to that of South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong or Singapore: a triumph of the market economy. In contrast, Mearsheimer believed in the possibility of a China more like Godzilla than Bambi. It was the best way to gain respect in today's anarchic world of international politics. The Chicago professor's final conclusion was the same one he maintains today: China could push the U.S. out of Asia and take over the region.
No one would currently question that both Russia and China are weaker than the U.S. But what is unquestionable on the military side may gradually be called into question on the economic side as China's GDP rises. Mearsheimer stresses that China's economic growth will lead to dominance in Asia in the same way that the US dominates the northern hemisphere. China's rise worries neighboring countries and they look to Washington for security guarantees. On the other hand, the Chinese have no known allies in Asia or elsewhere in the world, since the category of allies is not reserved for those who are only trading partners.
On the other hand, we must not forget that the international scenario is not at all reminiscent of the political blocs of yesteryear. Rather, it resembles a world in which anarchy coexists with a certain hierarchy. The disadvantages of an anarchic scenario can be alleviated, according to Mearsheimer, with the construction of regional hegemonies. The only hegemon is well known to all, and some states dare to challenge it because they are well aware that, despite its enormous capabilities, it is not strong enough to achieve global dominance. By contrast, China aspires to be a regional hegemon in Asia, taking advantage of the fact that its rival has dispersed its forces throughout the planet, something that would not be the case if its interests in the Western hemisphere were threatened. As Mearsheimer rightly points out, regional hegemony is no longer achieved by conquest, as was the case, for example, in the US westward expansion. In the case of China, hegemony will come from economic growth, so that it can dictate rules of behavior to its neighbors. We are seeing this in the cases of disputes over island territories or control of the water resources it shares with neighboring countries. Consequently, the next step will be to consolidate a doctrine Did not Japan try to do the same in the first half of the twentieth century?
All this could explain the growing importance of naval power in Asia and the fact that the Chinese, as many analysts point out, are closely following the teachings of the American naval historian and strategist Alfred Mahan (1840-1914), author of a classic work, The Influence of Naval Power in History (1660-1783). Mearsheimer's references to this work are not excessive, although there is no doubt that China takes it very much into account. In fact, our author indicates that the main purpose of having a large navy, despite the fact that China has lived with its back to the sea since the 15th century, is to expel the US navy from the successive island belts of the Pacific, starting with the nearest one, where Japan, Taiwan and the Philippines are located. If this were to happen, the seas near China would be sealed off and the US would be reduced in its ability to assist South Korea in a possible conflict, although it would undoubtedly have to do so by means of the "Japanese aircraft carrier", just as it did in 1950. Mearsheimer adds that China's hegemonic intentions would not end there and it would become present with its fleet in a second belt of islands such as those to the east of Japan, the Moluccas, Guam, the Carolinas, the Marianas..., so that Japan and the Philippines would be deprived of American naval support. After a detailed exposition, the Chicago professor surprises us with this question: China's strategic objectives are certainly ambitious, but will it be interested in pursuing them? Will rationalism and pragmatism prevail in Chinese behavior in the Asia-Pacific scenario? In any case, a large Chinese fleet will be necessary in the waters of the Indian Ocean, between South Asia and the Persian Gulf, which also entails control of the Indonesian and Malaysian Straits routes. This is the attitude to be expected from a superpower in the economic field.
Today, Beijing is militarily weaker than Washington and its Asian allies. As a result, China has had to present its hegemonic will as a "peaceful rise", an external projection of its Confucian culture, which places so much emphasis on prudence. Thus, a few years ago, the image emerged of a China that does not make direct threats or respond to provocations, and even maintains a cooperative attitude towards North Korea's nuclear program. Mearsheimer is certainly not convinced by this idyllic image, nor has it caught on in neighboring countries, especially given the intensification of territorial disputes. Moreover, any informed historian knows that China's foreign relations were never based on Confucian culture. Nevertheless, China has discovered Confucianism as an instrument of foreign policy, for it is a doctrine that preaches harmony and benevolence. It is a calling card for the new China on the international stage. In practice, however, the Chinese talk like idealists but act like realists.
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The United States will always face a dilemma in its relations with the Asian giant: containment or cooperation? The first option is the one used in the Cold War against the USSR, even if there was also minimal cooperation. But containment is a defensive strategy and runs the risk of leading to conflict. Hence, cooperation is essential and complementary to avoid greater evils, and so, as Mearsheimer rightly reminds us, the scenario may have analogies with that of pre-Great War Europe, when the Triple Entente allies were the main trading partners of the Kaiser's Germany. We also agree with the author when he questions the solidity of Washington's alliances with China's neighbors. An Asian NATO of sorts is not viable, therefore, not only because of the growing importance of bilateralism in the interstate relations The main reason for this is that these countries are weak in containing China and are separated from the US by a great distance. Moreover, Chinese and Americans are not at odds over ideology, despite the fact that a communist party rules in Beijing. The good news is that China has embraced capitalism, but the bad news is that it also practices nationalism which, for Mearsheimer, is the most powerful ideology on the planet.
Let us stress once again that China's strength lies in its economic growth. Can Washington slow it down, and for how long? Moreover, countries in the region such as South Korea, Japan, Taiwan and Australia have conditioned a large part of their economic prosperity on trade with China. And China is constantly sending them the message that economic interdependence is the way to economic prosperity. common welfareWhere can we find a trading partner like China? Moreover, if it were to reduce the level of its economic relations with China, other countries would soon fill the gap. This is yet another demonstration that it is the GNP that today marks the possibilities of hegemony.
The author's penchant for historical comparisons leads him to recall the book The great illusion (1910) by British writer and journalist Norman Angell, who argued that territorial conquests were obsolete and that in a war the industrial states had the most to lose. The work was a defense of rationality as the essence of statecraft, an expression of faith that economic interdependence would end wars. The 20th century disproved Angell, although the fathers of European integration must have read his book. Nor does the realist Mearsheimer believe that prosperity is an antidote to wars, which are born of irrationality. He thinks that, if necessary, China would not hesitate to invade Taiwan, a territory sacred to its nationalist faith. Nor does he rule out the possibility of localized wars in Asia, which would not have a generalized impact on common prosperity. There are historical examples of countries at war that have continued to trade.
Despite his historical knowledge, the author believes that the possibility of predicting the future by means of the past is very limited. However, he is convinced that China's rise will not be peaceful and conflict cannot be ruled out.even if they are on a small scale. In fact, he senses tomorrow in Asia in the form of a gathering storm, to use Churchill's expression of the Hitlerian threat, and considers that the chances of a confrontation between the US and China are greater than those between the Americans and the Soviets during the Cold War. Once again, with this chapter on China Mearsheimer shows signs of practicing stark realism, the same realism that has led him to call Putin a "world-class strategist" for his performance in Ukraine. The problem is that incumbent politicians do not usually adhere to this type of Bismarckian realism, considered by the author as "offensive realism", and move more comfortably on grounds of ambiguity. In any case, realist intellectuals such as the Chicago professor will gladly continue to play the role of Cassandra before a public opinion that does not like verbal subtleties or urgent appeals in foreign policy.
Antonio R. Rubio Plo
Degree in History and Law
International writer and analyst
@blogculturayfe / @arubioplo
